Walter Benjamin on Translation and Aesthetic Resistance: A Case for Practising Postcolonial Translation

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Abstract
In my paper, I shall first present Walter Benjamin’s views on ‘pure language’ as offering aesthetic resistance to the totalitarian idea of the ‘original’ in dominant discourse. A related question is of judging translations either by relative or universal standards. Within the context of translations across various boundaries, any sanitized standard will be solipsistic by default. Thereby we need to reformulate the question in order to appreciate a work of translation by locating it in the context of the phenomenology of language to arrive at the standards of judging translation. In light of this view, I shall discuss the problem of comparing different languages within a translation from Benjamin’s idea of understanding the other/foreignness of language from the perspectives of various translations rather than understanding the translations through the source text. Finally as a conclusion, I reflect on the importance of including all contexts and conditions of translation by which translation and a paratranslation exist as a space for deculturization, vulgarization, hybridization and aesthetic resistance.

Keywords: Foreignness, Meaning, Historicity, Translatability, Relationality, Pure Language, Freedom

Introduction – Some Debates
An important feature of translation is that it always exists in a context of interaction with others in that it always presupposes speakers of two different languages and so it cannot take place in a sanitized space of isolation and solipsism. There is a specific time and space in which a particular text is located and also a general space of literary studies attributed to it. Consequently, the experience of colonization can be considered as the ‘ontological position’ of postcolonial translation studies. As a speech act in the public domain, translation studies have tremendous potential to bring not just attitudinal changes but they also act as a vector of rebellions where aesthetic interventions can take place. The key question linked with postcolonial studies is that of bringing about emancipation and how do postcolonial translation studies achieve emancipation vis-à-vis the cannon or national culture variants of translated texts? TejaswiniNiranjana (1992) suggests retranslation to resist fetishization of cultural objects and constructs. As a textual means of political engagement, translation is achieved always with an eye to the stylistics of translation (poetics) rather than just the meaning of words (hermeneutics) from the source text. Translation is not mere transfer of the message from an original context.

Poststructuralist approaches to translation consider translation as a site of cultural production and identity formation. However Baltrush writes about Spivak in this regard that‘GayatriSpivak has been drawing attention to the fact that culturaization--as promoted by postmodern, postcolonialism and cultural studies--has led to depoliticization of academic
Translation studies get misused by default as a strategy and a method for controlling and canonizing identities by power structures. Her solution to resist this problem lies in “subject and/or collective resilience” (qtd. in Baltrusch 114). Translation thereby exists as a process of constant reconfiguration and deconstruction, a space of what Bhabha calls “hybridity”, a ‘third space’ (The Location 218, 221); it is also a space for double writing and a space for the construction of cultural meanings. It is a space of perpetual conflict of different perspectives in interaction.

In the light of the above background debates, I discuss the problem of comparing different languages within a translation from Benjamin’s idea of understanding the other/foreignness of language from the perspectives of various translations rather than understanding the translations through the source text.

**Walter Benjamin on How to Understand Translation**

Benjamin holds the view that in order to attain some knowledge of an art work, the receivers of art should not be taken into account. This is because art by itself does not presuppose any “ideal” receiver or any representative of any community of receivers. Although art presupposes both “corporal” and “spiritual” existence of human beings yet it does not presuppose human “attention”. He writes: “No poem is meant for the reader, no picture for the beholder, no symphony for the audience” (The Translator’s 151).

In this background, where art does not presuppose any attention from any receiver, the key question regarding the function of translation as an art form is: Is translation meant for those who do not understand the original text? Benjamin gives three clarifications in regards to this question. Firstly, translation does not mean to repeat “the same thing” as contained in the original text. This would be a fallacious understanding which presumes that an original text has something ‘essential’ to communicate that can be captured by the translator. However Benjamin is of the view that there is no ‘essential’ or central message to a work of art by which we can master the understanding of art works. He writes: ‘Neither message nor statement is essential to it [original text].’ (The Translator’s 152) Secondly, to say that a translation can convey only messages from the original text that are ‘inessential’ is also fallacious.

Thirdly, he puts forward another fallacious way of understanding translation. This constitutes the opinion that although works of art do not have any essence yet art objects like poetry contain some messages that are ‘the incomprehensible, the secret, the “poetic” (The Translator’s 152). According to this view only if a translator is a poet/writer only then he/she can decode the secret poetics in a work of art.

For Benjamin all the above three views are distinguishing features of a ‘bad translation’. For him neither the original nor a translated text aims at any receivers. Since the original text is not aimed at any audience we cannot understand translation in the light of any presupposed readers. Here one key distinction emerges between communication and conversation. While communication presupposes a content to be already there conversation has an aspect of relationality built into it which cannot be given. Translation is more of a conversation in this sense.

**What is Translation and Translatability of a Text?**

For Benjamin, ‘Translation is a mode.’ (The Translator’s 152) In order to capture this mode we need directions from the original text. The original contains the laws for translation in what he calls the ‘translatability’ of the original text. Benjamin writes that the translatability of
the original text can be understood in two ways. In the first sense translatability refers to the possibility of finding a translator among the totality of all the readers of text. In the second sense translatability refers to the possibility of translating the linguistic features of a text i.e. ‘whether it allows itself to be translated’ (The Translator’s 152) by the readers which allows them to translate it. So only some features of a text can be translated while others remain outside the scope of translation like in case of a Venn diagram. Benjamin argues that in the first sense even if all human beings have forgotten a text or if there is no human being available to translate it even then a text would still contain its proper ‘relational content’. Benjamin is of the view that ‘certain relational concepts gain their proper, indeed their best sense, when they are not from the outset connected exclusively with human beings.’ (The Translator’s 152) In other words, the relational concepts of a text are not dependent upon translation by human beings; the translatibility feature of a text will continue to exist even if human beings fail to connect with it and respond to it. Benjamin argues that hypothetically speaking if such a situation arises where a life moment or a text does not find a reference in any human beings, a reference point of response shall still exist ‘to a thought in the mind of God’(The Translator’s 152). In the second sense, the possibility of translating the linguistic features of a text should still be taken into consideration even if it turns out to be untranslatable by human beings or if human beings lack in the methods to translate it. In such cases we must also ask the question if translation of certain linguistic construction is required or not. However Benjamin refutes that possibility in arguing that ‘if translation is a mode, then translatability must be essential to certain works’ (The Translator’s 153). An important question to think in this regard relates to the fate of the untranslated elements of a text in face of new meanings attributed to the translatable elements of its text.

Translation is Not for the Sake of the Original

Translation is an ‘essential’ feature of texts yet this feature of translation of text is not essential for understanding the texts themselves but translatibility is an essential feature of texts because it expresses a ‘specific significance inherent in the original texts’(The Translator’s 153). The significance of a translation is not for the sake of the original text of which it is a translation rather it stands in ‘closest connection with the original’ by virtue of the translatability of the original text. This connection between the original and translation is not for the sake for the original and Benjamin calls it a ‘natural connection’ or ‘vital connection’ (The Translator’s 153). The source of translation lies in the original yet it does not exist for the sake of the original. Benjamin writes that there exists a ‘natural connection’ between the translation and the original: ‘Just as expressions of life are connected in the most intimate manner with the living being without any significance for the latter, a translation proceeds from the original. Not indeed so much from its life as from its “afterlife” or “survival” [Uberleben]’ (The Translator’s 153). A translation always comes after the original. Those texts which do not find ‘their chosen translators’ in the period of their production are considered to have reached their ‘continuing life [fortleben]’The life and continuing life of works should not be understood in metaphorical terms. Benjamin clarifies that life is not just ‘organic corporeal’ existence alone and also it should not be confused to be falling under the domain of ‘soul’ and in terms of other aspects of animal life like ‘sensitivity’. He is of the view that ‘life is attributed to everything that has a history, and not to that which is only a stage setting for history’ (153). Historicity of a thing is what makes us attribute life and continuing life to it. The range of life of a thing is ‘delimited on the basis of history and not of nature’ (153). The task of a philosopher for Benjamin is ‘to understand all
natural life on the basis of the more comprehensive life of history’ (*The Translator’s* 154). It is relatively easier to understand the life and continuing life of works of art in their historicity as compared to that of living beings. The history of works of art constitutes knowledge of their descent from their sources, their shaping in the age of the artists, and the periods of their basically eternal continuing life in later generations’ (154). This eternal continuing life when it occurs is called ‘fame’. Translations that involve just transmissions of messages are considered as bad translations. However translations which are more than mere transmission of messages are produced when the work of art in its continuing life (when there are no translators available in the period of the production of the work) reaches an eternal continuing life, i.e. age of fame. The translation then no longer needs to ‘serve the work’s fame’ since it has already reached the age of its fame. Such translations present the ‘constantly renewed, latest and most comprehensive unfolding’ of the original text.

**Unfolding the Relation Between Languages in Translation**

This ‘comprehensive unfolding’ of the original text is an unfolding of a ‘special, high form of life’ and it is determined by a ‘special, high purposefulness’ (154). Benjamin writes that: ‘All purposeful phenomena of life, as well as life’s purposefulness itself, are in the final analysis purposeful not for life, but for the expression of its essence, for the representation of its significance.’ (*The Translator’s* 154) Similarly the ‘special, high purposefulness’ of translation lies in the ‘expression of the most intimate relationships among languages’ (*The Translator’s* 154). Translation does not ‘produce or reveal’ this relationship but it ‘represents’ it by realizing this intimate relationship between languages in a most intensive and seminal way. We first acquire the ability for a language and then we learn a particular language. In translation an intended object is represented in a special mode that is ‘by means of an incomplete form or seed of its production’ (*The Translator’s* 154). This mode of representation in translation is intensive and is very different from the type of reference in non-linguistic expressions as in analogies and signs which involves an ‘anticipatory, intimating realization’. Translation is based on an ‘imagined, inner relationship among languages’ which connects them. For Benjamin this relationship ‘consists in the fact that languages are not alien to each other, but a priori, and independently of all historical connections, related to each other in what they want to say’ (*The Translator’s* 154-155).

Benjamin connects this idea with the traditional theory of translation which considers that the functions of translation lie in imitating the form and sense of the original text as accurately as possible. He raises the question that although the traditional theory of translation argues that the role of translation is to imitate the form and sense of the original as accurately as possible yet it does not account for what does accuracy imply and in how it is to be achieved in a translation. It does not give any information about what is essential to a translation. Benjamin writes that the connection between original and translated text is much deeper than mere similarity. He adopts a line of thought from critical epistemology that it puts forth ‘in demonstrating the impossibility of reflection theory’. According to critical epistemology it is impossible to claim any objective knowledge in case of reflection theory if the reflection theory consists in ‘reflections of the real’. Benjamin takes up the same view and argues that translation consists in reflections of the real and so it cannot claim to have any essence or objective knowledge associated with it. Hence no translation would be possible in accordance with any essence associated with translation that aims at achieving similarity with the original. There would be no continuing life of an original text possible if it is not transformed and renewed. (Similarity it will keep the original text
stagnant and will prohibit its growth.). Even established words with defined meanings undergo a renewal in the process of ‘after-ripening’. Similarly in case of poetic language the intended tendency of a poet in using that language in the time of its production may change later in the afterlife of the text in which new ‘immanent tendencies’ may arise from the formed poetic language. This is why some texts which appear fresh in the time of their production may later turn out to be stale and those which seem natural may seem to be archaic. To emphasize that there is something essential to such historical processes of transformations of the texts would be erroneous. This is because such transformations do not emanate from the inner life of language and its works but from the ‘constant transformations of sense, in the subjectivity of the later generations’(155). The author’s intended language dies out with the passage of time in the light of transformations in its tone and significance brought about by later generations. Even if we consider the last stroke of the author’s pen as putting an end to the work it will still not be enough to save the traditional theory of translation which aims are imitating the form and sense of the original text as accurately as possible since its tone and significance is not fixed in the author’s language but they continue to change with time with the changing sense in the subjectivity of later generations and cannot be captured. Within the postcolonial context, we can understand Benjamin’s views in terms of acknowledging both the writer’s intention and reader’s responses as contributing to the understanding of a text. Although the writer disappears as soon as the writing is over, the reader’s continue to add new significance and new tone to the original text’s language with which the translator struggles to work. As an implication this view is very significant in comparing languages within postcolonial translations. One key aspect of judging languages within translations that emerges from this view is that it demands to first put the translations in their context of changing languages in order to make an aesthetic judgment about them. Benjamin writes that both the literary language of the original text as well as the native language of the translator continues to change with time: ‘For just as the tone and significance of great literary works are completely transformed over the centuries, the translator’s native language is also transformed’ (The Translator’s 156). While the poetic language continues to live in its own language, the translation is taken up into the ‘growth of its language’ and it ceases to exist with the renewal of its language. Translation exists between two dead languages namely that of the author to which it adds a new tone and significance and the new language that marks the death of the translation itself with the growth of the translator’s native language. Translation marks the ‘after ripening of the alien word, and the birth pangs of its own’ (The Translator’s 156).

The kinship between languages is not based on similarity between the original and translation rather it is otherwise. The term kinship here is used in a narrow sense which has an indispensable connection with the ‘similarity of origin’. However this narrow sense of kinship implies ‘historical kinship’ between the original and the translation. This kinship is sought in the similarity of literary text and not in the similarity of their words. In other words, to put this kinship in the context of postcolonial translation one can argue that it already is rooted in a historical kinship of their text of colonial experience to which translations respond and not to achieve similarity between words.

‘Pure Language’ as Intercultural Understanding between Languages

Benjamin writes that a translator’s task is ‘to find the intention toward the language into which the work is to be translated, on the basis of which an echo of the original can be awakened in it’ (The Translator’s 159). This feature marks a distinction between the work of a translator...
and that of a poet. Unlike a translator a poet’s intention is never directed toward the ‘language, as such, in totality’ but he is more concerned with ‘the linguistic structuring of the content’ (The Translator’s 159). A literary work finds itself in the middle of the forest of language from which it chooses to give a linguistic structure to its content and it exists in it as part of it. On the other hand, the work of translation approaches the forest of language from outside through a particular entry point in the language of the original text through which it can produce the similar ‘reverberations’ from a foreign language. In Benjamin’s words, ‘the translation calls to the original within, at that one point where the echo in its own language can produce a reverberation of the foreign language’s work’ (The Translator’s 159). Not only the task of a translator is different from that of a poet but also the intention of a translator is different from that of a poet. According to Benjamin, ‘the poet’s intention is spontaneous, primary, concrete, whereas the translator’s is derivative, final, ideal.’ (The Translator’s 159) This is because a translator is engaged with the ‘great motive of integrating the plurality of languages into a single true language’ (The Translator’s 159). Within such an integration the ‘individual propositions, poetic structures and judgments never arrive at a agreement (since they remain dependent on translation) it is rather the languages themselves that agree, complemented and reconciled with each other in their mode of intention’(The Translator’s 159). Benjamin is of the view that if we assume that there is “the true language” a language of truth in which is stored in peace or silently all the ‘ultimate secrets toward which all thinking strives’ and all perfection lies in the anticipation and description of such true language then this true language is ‘intensively concealed’ in translation. Although there is no muse of either philosophy or translation yet an essential characteristic of a philosophical genius is ‘the longing for the language that is announced in translation’(The Translator’s 159). Translation bearing the seeds of such a language ‘stands half-way between poetry and doctrine’. Although the work of translation is ‘less prominent’ than that of doctrine yet it has a deep impact on history.

**Freedom and Fidelity in Translation**

The task of a translator in bringing the seeds of pure language to maturity is an impossible task which cannot be determined in any realization. There is no ground for any realization within translation which does aim at reproduction of meaning. According to Benjamin the traditional concepts of freedom to make according to meaning and that of fidelity as opposed to following the ‘word’ within the context of translations ceases to make sense in case of translation that does not seek for reproduction of meaning. Benjamin is very critical of the role of these two concepts even within a conventional theory of translation. They exist in an ‘irresolvable conflict’ with each other. Even fidelity in translating each word from the original does not help in capturing meaning fully within a translation. This is because meaning is not independently realized in the capturing each object of intention but it is viewed in accordance with ‘the poetic significance for the original work’ and precisely in ‘the way the intended object is bound up with the mode of intention in a particular word’ (160). In other words, we can say that ‘words carry emotional connotations’ within a literary text. The word-to-word translation runs the risk of leading to more incomprehensibility as opposed to capturing meaning. Hölderlin’s translation of Socrates is an example of such literal translation. Benjamin concludes that ‘fidelity in rendering form makes rendering meaning more difficult’and further that we cannot deduce the need for observing fidelity from the need for maintaining meaning. The interest in meaning serves as a pretext for many bad translations than serving poetry and language. This can also be understood in the following analogy: Just as fragments of a vessel...
need not resemble each other in an identical way rather they need to correspond to each other in the tiniest detail in order to be recognized as fragments of the same vessel. Similarly in a translation each object of intention (each word) need not resemble the other. Instead of making the translation resemble the meaning of original we must emphasize that a translation should be able to ‘fashion in its own language a counterpart to the original’s mode of intention’ in order to make both of them recognizable as ‘fragments of a greater language’ (160). A translation must not focus on trying to communicate or to render meaning. The original is essential to the translation because it frees the translation from the burden of organization of what is communicated. The Biblical ‘In the beginning was the word’ holds valid in case of translation but the translation must free itself from ‘the bondage to meaning’ so that its own ‘mode of intentio’ may appear not as a mode of ‘intentio to reproduce, but rather as harmony, as a complement to its language in which language communicates itself’ (161). Hence a translation can be read as if it were an original work in translation’s own language especially in the age of production of the original text. The concept of fidelity presumes that the goal of completion of language has already been achieved by the original which needs to be accurately represented in the original. However Benjamin writes that: ‘True translation is transparent, it does not obscure the original, does not stand in its light, but rather allows pure language, as if strengthened by its own medium, to shine even more fully on the original.’ (162) For Benjamin this translation is possible in ‘conveying the syntax word-for-word’ and for him ‘the word, not the sentence is the original element of translation’ (162). Sentence poses itself as a wall in front of translation that tries to block its movement while it is the word-for-word rendering that exists as an arcade through which translation can make its passage. Freedom and fidelity are two conflicting concepts within the theories of translation. A deeper interpretation of one of them does not reconcile the conflict between them rather it closes the possibility of justification for the other. Freedom implies the freedom to render meaning which is no longer ‘to be regarded as normative’. If somehow it can be put forward that the ‘meaning of a linguistic construction is identical with the meaning of its communication’ even then can we say that that ‘something ultimate and decisive remain beyond any message, very near it and yet definitely distant, hidden under it or clearer, broken by it or more powerful’ (162). Benjamin argues there remains something incommunicable beyond the reach of the communicable and the linguistic constructions of all languages. This incommunicable aspect of all languages is encountered depending upon the context in ‘either symbolizing or symbolized; symbolized however in the development of the languages themselves’ (162). It is this ‘kernel of pure language’ namely the hidden and incommunicable feature of all languages that is to be represented and produced in the development of languages. But if this ‘hidden and fragmentary kernel is nevertheless, present in life as something symbolized, it inhabits linguistic constructions as symbolizing something’. In other words if the hidden element of language is already symbolized in life then it exists in language as symbolizing that hidden and fragmentary element as it exists symbolized in life. This ultimate feature is ‘pure speech’ itself but in languages it is related to linguistic constructions and its transformations which is ‘burdened with heavy and alien meaning’ (162). Translation alone has the potential to free itself from the burden of meaning, ‘to turn the symbolizing element into the symbolized’ in order to recover the pure language from its development. This pure language no longer signifies or expresses anything. But it arrives at a level where all meaning and all intention is extinguished. Pure language here exists as an ‘expressionless and creative word’ that is the intended object of all language and all communication. Freedom in translation acquires a new and higher level of justification. Freedom
here does not acquire its ground from meaning rather it is the engagement with truth that separates freedom from meaning. Benjamin writes: ‘Freedom does not gain its standing from the communications’ meaning; it is precisely truth’s task to emancipate freedom from meaning.’ (The Translator’s163) In a translation this higher concept of freedom (not rooted in meaning) demonstrates through the translator’s language its potential to contribute to the pure language. It sets free the pure language ‘imprisoned in the work’ in the original into the foreign language i.e. the translator’s own language by rewriting it. This it does by breaking the barriers of its own language and thereby widening its horizons as is done by translators like Luther, Voss, Hölderlin in case of German language translations. Benjamin raises the question of the significance of meaning in the relation between original and translation. The answer to it can be understood through a comparison. Just as a tangent touches a circle at an infinitely small single point and it is this small contact and not the point that prescribes the law according to which the tangent pursues its path to infinity. Similarly a translation touches the original at an infinitely small point of meaning in order to follow its own path to infinity ‘in the freedom of linguistic development’ in accordance with the law of fidelity.

To what extent a translation can correspond to this mode of translation depends on the translatability of the original text. According to Benjamin, lesser the ‘value and dignity’ of the language of the original the more it becomes a communication for meaning and the less is to be gained for it in translation to an extent that instead of offering an entry point for translation, the burden of meaning in such a text makes translation impossible. The richer the ‘work’s constitution’ the more is the translatability of the text through some entry point as offered by meaning. This applies only in case of original texts. On the other hand, translations are untranslatable not because they are heavily loaded with meaning but because meaning is attached to them only ‘flemtingly’ or transiently (164). In translations meaning ceases to distinguish between the flow of language and the flow of revelation. It is full of confusion and chaos. However, an original text ‘belongs to truth or doctrine without the mediation of meaning, in its literalness of true language, it is unconditionally translatable’ (165). This translatability is not for the sake of the text but for other languages. Benjamin is of the view that ‘just as language and revelation must be united in the text, literalness and freedom must be united in the form of an interlinear translation’ (165). For him ‘All great writings and all scriptures have a virtual translation between the lines. The ‘interlinear version of the Holy Scriptures is the prototype or ideal of all translation.’ (165)

**Conclusion: Possibilities of Comparing Languages in Translations---Relative or Universal Standards?**

Coming to the question of postcolonial translation studies which exist in the context of power structures and multiplicities of languages, colonization exists as an ontological position where questions of historicity and representation can be raised. Postcolonial translation in this sense is closely located in a specific context, a spatio-temporal zone and in the general context of literary studies as a manifestation of colonization itself. One can argue that in this sense it is a domain of conversations and not mere communication of linguistic meanings.

One of the key distinctions between communication and conversation is that while communication aims at conveying a pre-decided content, conversation involves a ‘relational content’ which cannot be represented or pre-decided in a conversation. Translation is not mere transfer of the message from an original context (communication). Benjamin observes, ‘Translation is a mode’. If language has the capacity for bearing meaning within philosophic
concepts then translation consists in finding equivalents to them. Translation as a mode, only points to the meaning as possibilities within concepts. It first de-sematicizes the source language and then finds equivalents in the target language and finally points to the meaning. The question of meaning in translation is prior to linguistic meaning since we first acquire the ability for a language (as a symbolic language of gestures etc) and then we learn a particular language.

For Benjamin there is foreignness to language in that it cannot be owned by anyone and it can be used by any other. All languages are connected with each other in a kinship which is ‘historical kinship’. It marks a similarity between texts and not in the similarity of their words (linguistic kinship). While it is possible to translate some aspects of a text, some other textual aspects resist translation. Like in case of mathematical symbols, the same symbols exist across all languages similarly translation aims at finding equivalents to concepts in all languages till we reach a point of a higher linguistic system where there is no foreignness between languages. Benjamin calls this higher language as ‘pure language’ as a meta-linguistic capacity of human beings. Translation is a meaning making activity in this sense.

Benjamin considers that the continued life of original texts exists through translation which offers development of languages and decreases the foreignness of languages in the process of their communication with each other. In such a context, what happens to the quality of postcolonial resistance through translation with the passage of time? In other words, how is it that we judge the quality of a postcolonial translation within a continued context of exchange over a period of translation within languages? Do we ascribe universal or relative standards of valuation in judging and comparing different languages in translation?

Benjamin’s concept of ‘pure language’ can be seen as the goal of all translation as a meta-linguistic human capacity for intercultural understanding. It is a merging of all languages into an advanced linguistic system. It exists as a spiritual connection of all people to enter into conversations and possibilities with each other. Different languages develop through this process and each language is to be judged within all possible contexts of the translation in that language as a whole.

In the light of what Benjamin asserts in his approach to ‘pure language’ to reduce the distinctness between languages, I argue that it is not correct to judge language through any sanitized standard of valuation when two different languages are involved in translation. The solution as offered by many theorists lie in ‘hybridity’, ‘double-writing’, ‘radical bilingualism’, ‘deconstruction’ and ‘transculturation’ and ‘Paratranslation’ which refers to all context and conditions of translation as an interdisciplinary space.

Notes

1As quoted by Burghard Baltrusch in Translation as Aesthetic Resistance: Paratranslating Walter Benjamin (114).


3Nietzsche in ‘The uses and disadvantages of History for life’ mentions three ways of living namely, unhistorical, historical and suprahistorical ways of living in relation to the question of what makes us happy. Animals live in an unhistorical way since they forget their past. Humans live in a
historical way by remembering their past both good and bad moments. One feature of this life is that human beings cannot forget their bad memories because they are unhistorical beings. The third kind of life is the suprahistorical life in which human beings live each moment as complete in it. Instead of aiming at becoming they aspire for eternal things like art in life. It tries to find a balance between historical and unhistorical life by rejecting bad moments and accepting the good memories in order to present a critical judgment on history.

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